A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games
In this paper, the authors reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent-seeking." They stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. The authors give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 73 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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