Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights
In order to analyze conflict and cooperation between a State and a non ruling group in a general equilibrium, I unite pure rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict under an assumption of incomplete property rights. I show that a unique and globally stable Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Cooperation breakdowns appear to be twofold: generalized conflict driven by a collapse of the State and one- sided rebellion due to the coexistence between a strong State and a weak minority. Natural resources increase the conflict intensity but raise also the cost of rebellion for the ruler inducing this one to be more benevolent toward his minority.
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