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Global threats and the domestic struggle for power

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  • Garfinkel, Michelle R.

Abstract

This paper considers an economy where groups compete in a contest for power to redistribute future income in their favor. An increased external threat of terrorism--either an increase in the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack or a greater loss of income in the event of a successful attack--would tend to reduce the expected value of the contest prize and thus lessen the severity of the conflict at home. However, unless the marginal return from guarding against terrorism is not too large or diminishes at a sufficiently fast rate, such a shock could imply, in equilibrium, both a greater sense of security among the groups against external threats and a greater conflict between them in the domestic struggle for power.
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Suggested Citation

  • Garfinkel, Michelle R., 2004. "Global threats and the domestic struggle for power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 495-508, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:2:p:495-508
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Enrico Spolaore, 2012. "The Economics of Political Borders," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0767, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    2. Enrico Spolaore, 2009. "National Borders, Conflict and Peace," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0744, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    3. Chang, Yang-Ming & Sanders, Shane & Walia, Bhavneet, 2015. "The costs of conflict: A choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-65.
    4. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
      [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]
      ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
    7. J. Nassios & J.A. Giesecke, 2015. "The Macroeconomic and Sectoral Effects of Terrorism in the U.S.: A Reconciliation of CGE and Econometric Approaches," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers g-256, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
    8. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "A small victorious war: political institutions and international conflict," MPRA Paper 17041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Blomberg, S. Brock & Hess, Gregory D. & Orphanides, Athanasios, 2004. "The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1007-1032, July.
    10. Blomberg, S. Brock & Broussard, Nzinga H. & Hess, Gregory D., 2011. "New wine in old wineskins? Growth, terrorism and the resource curse in sub-Saharan Africa," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages 50-63.
    11. Tilman Brück & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 2004. "The Economic Consequences of Terror: A Brief Survey," HiCN Working Papers 03, Households in Conflict Network.
    12. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
    13. Zaman, Nadeem Uz & Ghutai, Gul & Khan, Kaneez Raza, 2012. "The nature, sources and the socio-economic effects of terrorism in Balochistan," MPRA Paper 37075, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Libman Alexander, 2010. "A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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