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Employer’s information and promotion-seeking activities

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  • Gil S Epstein

Abstract

This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals’ allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer’s knowledge (information) regarding the employees’ productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S Epstein, 2012. "Employer’s information and promotion-seeking activities," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 21-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:ove:journl:aid:9631
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    File URL: https://reunido.uniovi.es/index.php/EBL/article/view/9631
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Gil Epstein & Uriel Spiegel, 1997. "Monitoring within the Firm and Manager Relations," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 51-61.
    3. Sheshinski, Eytan, 2000. "Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in A Self-Selection Model," MPRA Paper 56141, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2002.
    4. Henry S. Farber & Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-1047.
    5. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February.
    6. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    7. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    9. Hillman, Arye L. & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 129-142, November.
    10. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262, Springer.
    11. Gil S Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2012. "Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 624-638.
    12. Epstein, Gil S. & Spiegel, Uriel, 2001. "Natural inequality, production and economic growth," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 463-473, September.
    13. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2007. "Endogenous Public Policy and Contests," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-540-74818-2, December.
    14. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    15. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gil S. Epstein & Renana Lindner‐Pomerantz, 2017. "The Survival of Unique Corporate Cultures," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(4), pages 622-629, June.

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