IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_868.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model

Author

Listed:
  • Eytan Sheshinski

Abstract

When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce’s (1959) model of random choice to a work-retirement decision model and show that the optimal provision of choice is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity in the population and that even with very small degrees of non-rationality it may be optimal not to provide individuals any choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Eytan Sheshinski, 2003. "Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 868, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_868
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp868.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mirrlees, James A., 1987. "Economic Policy and Nonrational Behavior," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9tw447ws, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    2. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
    3. ANDERSON, Simon P. & de PALMA, André & THISSE, Jacques-François, 1992. "Interpretations of the logit discrete choice models and the theory of product differentiation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995. "Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ravi Kanbur & Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2006. "Non‐Welfarist Optimal Taxation And Behavioural Public Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 849-868, December.
    2. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2012. "Liberté et société post-utilitariste," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 3-18.
    3. Raj Chetty & Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 2009. "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1145-1177, September.
    4. Gang, Ira & Epstein, Gil S, 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 3585, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Mikhalishchev, Sergei, 2023. "Optimal menu when agents make mistakes," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 25-33.
    6. Tyson, Christopher J., 2008. "Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 51-70, January.
    7. O'Donoghue, Ted & Rabin, Matthew, 2006. "Optimal sin taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1825-1849, November.
    8. Gil S Epstein, 2012. "Employer’s information and promotion-seeking activities," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 21-32.
    9. Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006. "Commitment vs. Flexibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 365-396, March.
    10. Mattsson, Lars-Göran & Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2004. "Better may be worse: Some monotonicity results and paradoxes in discrete choice," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 558, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 13 Sep 2006.
    11. Sheshinski, Eytan, 2000. "Optimal Policy to Influence Individual Choice Probabilities," MPRA Paper 55490, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2002.
    12. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2019. "Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    13. Jörgen Weibull & Lars-Göran Mattsson & Mark Voorneveld, 2007. "Better May be Worse: Some Monotonicity Results and Paradoxes in Discrete Choice Under Uncertainty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 121-151, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Helmuth Cremer & Jean‐Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Social Security And Retirement Decision: A Positive And Normative Approach," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 213-233, April.
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2259-2281, September.
    3. Slack, Sean & Ulph, David, 2014. "Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October.
    5. Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2010. "A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance," Working Paper Series 840, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    6. Rehn, Eric, 2007. "Imperfect Tagging Revisited," Working Papers 2007:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    7. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Designing optimal disability insurance," Working Papers 628, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    8. Timothy Waidman & John Bound & Austin Nichols, 2003. "Disability Benefits as Social Insurance: Tradeoffs Between Screening Stringency and Benefit Generosity in Optimal Program Design," Working Papers wp042, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    9. Oliver Fabel, 1995. "Disability insurance in an optimal pension scheme," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 157-183, June.
    10. Daniel Vuuren, 2014. "Flexible Retirement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 573-593, July.
    11. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2013. "A continuous model of income insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(6), pages 938-960, December.
    12. Holen , Dag S., 2007. "Disabillity Pension Motivated Income Adjustment," Memorandum 17/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    13. Laurence, JACQUET, 2006. "Optimal disability assistance when fraud and stigma matter," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006052, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    14. Sean Slack & David Ulph, 2014. "Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201411, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
    15. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Wojciech Kopczuk, 2011. "Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 54-90, February.
    16. Bound, John & Cullen, Julie Berry & Nichols, Austin & Schmidt, Lucie, 2004. "The welfare implications of increasing disability insurance benefit generosity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2487-2514, December.
    17. Simon P Anderson & Jacob K Goeree & Charles A Holt, 2001. "A Thoeretical Anlysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000075, David K. Levine.
    18. Jonathan Gruber & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 1994. "Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor Supply of Older Workers," NBER Working Papers 4941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2006. "Disability insurance and optimal income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(6), pages 717-732, November.
    20. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2002. "Départ à la retraite d'un point de vue de la taxation optimale," CREPP Working Papers 0212, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    logit; self-selection; moral-hazard; retirement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_868. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.