A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance
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Other versions of this item:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2010. "A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance," Seminar Papers 763, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2010. "A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance," Working Paper Series 840, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2006.
"A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms,"
Working Paper Series
659, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2006. "A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1675, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2006. "A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms," Seminar Papers 742, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Monojit Chatterji & Colin J. Tilley, 2002. "Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 669-687, October.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006.
"Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing,"
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University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 257-279, April.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2004. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," NBER Working Papers 10792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000450, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. " The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
- Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G & Treble, John G, 1994. " Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 561-566.
- Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995. "Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Per Johansson & Erica Lindahl, 2013.
"Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment,"
Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1673-1695, June.
- Johansson, Per & Lindahl, Erica, 2010. "Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment," Working Paper Series 2010:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
More about this item
Keywordsmoral hazard; disability insurance; sick pay; work absence; social norms;
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
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