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Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

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  • Erik Ansink

    (Wageningen University)

  • Arjan Ruijs

    (Wageningen University)

Abstract

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2007. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Working Papers 2007.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.16
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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    4. Dinar, Ariel & Rosegrant, Mark W. & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, 1997. "Water allocation mechanisms : principles and examples," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1779, The World Bank.
    5. Kilgour, D. Marc & Dinar, Ariel, 1995. "Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1474, The World Bank.
    6. Lynne Lewis Bennett & Charles W. Howe & James Shope, 2000. "The Interstate River Compact as a Water Allocation Mechanism: Efficiency Aspects," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-1015.
    7. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    8. D. Kilgour & Ariel Dinar, 2001. "Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 43-60, January.
    9. Booker J. F. & Young R. A., 1994. "Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for Colorado River Water Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 66-87, January.
    10. Janmaat, John A & Ruijs, Arjan, 2006. "Investing in Arms to Secure Water," MPRA Paper 10667, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bhaduri, Anik & Perez, Nicostrato D. & Liebe, Jens, 2008. "Scope and Sustainability of Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing of the Volta River," Discussion Papers 43324, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    2. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 187-210, February.
    3. Seemanta Bhagabati & Akiyuki Kawasaki & Mukand Babel & Peter Rogers & Sarawut Ninsawat, 2014. "A Cooperative Game Analysis of Transboundary Hydropower Development in the Lower Mekong: Case of the 3S Sub-basins," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(11), pages 3417-3437, September.
    4. Maja Schl�ter & Alessandro Tavoni & Simon Levin, 2014. "Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons to environmental variability," GRI Working Papers 146, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    5. Dinar, Shlomi & Katz, David & De Stefano, Lucia & Blankespoor, Brian, 2014. "Climate change, conflict, and cooperation : global analysis of the resilience of international river treaties to increased water variability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6916, The World Bank.
    6. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2013. "Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 639-655.
    7. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2015. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 807-831, April.
    8. Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold, 2016. "Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 92-117.
    9. Dinar, Ariel & Blankespoor, Brian & Dinar, Shlomi & Kurukulasuriya, Pradeep, 2010. "Does precipitation and runoff variability affect treaty cooperation between states sharing international bilateral rivers?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2568-2581, October.
    10. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Fixed Water Sharing Agreements Sustainable to Drought," TSE Working Papers 11-270, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    11. Xueqin Zhu & Ekko Ierland, 2012. "Economic Modelling for Water Quantity and Quality Management: A Welfare Program Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 26(9), pages 2491-2511, July.
    12. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
    13. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel, 2010. "Hot Stuff: Would Climate Change Alter Transboundary Water Sharing Treaties?," LERNA Working Papers 10.15.321, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    14. Jason F. L. Koopman & Onno Kuik & Richard S. J. Tol & Roy Brouwer, 2017. "The potential of water markets to allocate water between industry, agriculture, and public water utilities as an adaptation mechanism to climate change," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 325-347, February.
    15. Lucia De Stefano & James Duncan & Shlomi Dinar & Kerstin Stahl & Kenneth M Strzepek & Aaron T Wolf, 2012. "Climate change and the institutional resilience of international river basins," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 49(1), pages 193-209, January.
    16. Dinar, Ariel & Blankespoor, Brian & Dinar, Shlomi & Kurukulasuriya, Pradeep, 2010. "The impact of water supply variability on treaty cooperation between international bilateral river basin riparian states," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5307, The World Bank.
    17. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Kong, Wen & Knapp, Keith C., 2014. "Economic and Political Equilibrium for a Renewable Natural Resource with International Trade," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170591, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Water Allocation; Stability; Climate Change; Game Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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