Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements
We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.feem.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dinar, Ariel & Rosegrant, Mark W. & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, 1997. "Water allocation mechanisms : principles and examples," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1779, The World Bank.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005.
"Applications of negotiation theory to water issues,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3641, The World Bank.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2006. "Applications of negotiation theory to water issues," Working Papers 2006_09, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000.
"The importance of structure in linking games,"
Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists,
International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 24(1), December.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995.
"The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lynne Lewis Bennett & Charles W. Howe & James Shope, 2000. "The Interstate River Compact as a Water Allocation Mechanism: Efficiency Aspects," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-1015.
- D. Kilgour & Ariel Dinar, 2001. "Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 43-60, January.
- Booker J. F. & Young R. A., 1994. "Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for Colorado River Water Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 66-87, January.
- Janmaat, John A & Ruijs, Arjan, 2006. "Investing in Arms to Secure Water," MPRA Paper 10667, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kilgour, D. Marc & Dinar, Ariel, 1995. "Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1474, The World Bank.
- Barret, Scott & DEC, 1994. "Conflict and cooperation in managing international water resources," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1303, The World Bank.
- Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.