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Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre von Mouche

    (Wageningen Universiteit)

  • Henk Folmer

    (Wageningen Universiteit and Rijksuniversiteit Groning)

Abstract

Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre von Mouche & Henk Folmer, 2007. "Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?," Working Papers 2007.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.60
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 24(1), December.
    2. Jean-Pierre BenoƮt & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Policy; Linking; Folk Theorem; Tensor Game; Prsioners' Dilemma; Full Cooperation; Pareto Efficiency; Minkowski Sum; Vector Maximum; Convex Analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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