Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 24(1), December.
- Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996.
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More about this item
KeywordsEnvironmental Policy; Linking; Folk Theorem; Tensor Game; Prsioners' Dilemma; Full Cooperation; Pareto Efficiency; Minkowski Sum; Vector Maximum; Convex Analysis;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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