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An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy

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  • Cabral, Luís M B

Abstract

I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Cabral, Luís M B, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3878
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James, 2001. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 244-276, April.
    2. Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-664, October.
    3. Luis M. B. Cabral, 2001. "Optimal Brand Umbrella Size," Working Papers 01-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    4. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2008. "Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 1-26, May.
    5. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    6. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 127-139, November.
    7. Joseph F. Francois & Henrik Horn, 1998. "Competition Policy in an Open Economy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-092/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2000. "The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 845-855, May.
    9. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2001. "Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    11. Damien NEVEN & Paul SEABRIGHT, 1995. "Trade Liberalisation and the Co-ordination of Competition Policy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9503, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    12. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    13. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-795, September.
    14. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
    15. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2003. "International merger policy coordination," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 21-30, January.
    16. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    17. Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
    18. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-1123, November.
    19. Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2000. "Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    20. Mark Rysman, 2000. "Competition Policy as Strategic Trade," Papers 0100, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Breinlich, Holger & Nocke, Volker & Schutz, Nicolas, 2015. "Merger policy in a quantitative model of internationaltrade," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64983, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Cabral, Luis & Ozbay, Erkut Y. & Schotter, Andrew, 2014. "Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 100-121.
    3. Cosimo Beverelli & Kornel Mahlstein, 2011. "Outsourcing and Competition Policy," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 131-147, June.
    4. Bertrand, Olivier & Ivaldi, Marc, 2006. "European Competition Policy in International Markets," IDEI Working Papers 419, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    5. Breinlich, Holger & Nocke, Volker & Schutz, Nicolas, 2017. "International aspects of merger policy: A survey," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 415-429.
    6. repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:170-217 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "International antitrust institutions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 72, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    merger policy; repeated games;

    JEL classification:

    • F00 - International Economics - - General - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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