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International aspects of merger policy: A survey

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  • Breinlich, Holger
  • Nocke, Volker
  • Schutz, Nicolas

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. We first adopt a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict between national antitrust authorities and on the gains from international merger policy coordination. Taking trade costs as given, we use standard oligopoly models to derive conditions on market structure, under which underenforcement or overenforcement of national merger policies can arise. We then study the interactions between merger policy and trade policy, and find that trade liberalization often leads to stricter national merger policies. We conclude by discussing empirical evidence on conflict between antitrust authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Breinlich, Holger & Nocke, Volker & Schutz, Nicolas, 2017. "International aspects of merger policy: A survey," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 415-429.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:415-429
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Onur A. Koska, 2016. "A Consumer-Surplus Standard in Merger Approvals, Foreign Direct Investment, and Welfare," ERC Working Papers 1612, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2016.
    2. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2017. "Analysis of Merger Control in A Network Products Market," Discussion Paper Series 169, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Nov 2017.
    3. Onur A. Koska, 2018. "Gains from Multinational Competition for Cross-Border Firm Acquisition," ERC Working Papers 1801, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Jan 2018.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers and acquisitions; Merger policy; Trade policy; Oligopoly; International trade;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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