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Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization

  • Horn, H.
  • Levinsohn, J.

This paper is about the interactions between what is traditionally considered trade policy and a narrow but important aspect of competition policy, namely merger policy. We focus on links between merger policies and trade liberalization. Interpreting merger policy as a choice of degree of industrial concentration, we investigate how the merger policy that is optimal from the point of view of an individual country is affected by restrictions on the use of tariffs and export subsidies. Two general points emerge. First, merger policies are indeed associated with international externalities in open economies. And second, we argue that one should not expect to find any particular relationship between trade policy and merger policy. In particular, there seems to be no presumption that international trade liberalization induces countries to pursue merger policies that have more of a beggar-thy-neighbor flavor.

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Paper provided by Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan in its series Working Papers with number 420.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:420
Contact details of provider: Postal: ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN 48109
Web page: http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/
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  1. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 1996. "Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 1544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Auquier, A A & Caves, R E, 1979. "Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 559-81, September.
  3. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  4. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Mavroidis, Petros C. & DEC, 1993. "Competition, competition policy, and the GATT," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1228, The World Bank.
  5. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  6. Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
  7. repec:dgr:uvatin:19980092 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
  9. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
  10. Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-64, October.
  11. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-23, November.
  12. Mark Rysman, 2000. "Competition Policy as Strategic Trade," Papers 0100, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  13. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
  14. Peter Lloyd & Gary Sampson, 1995. "Competition and Trade Policy: Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Round," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 681-705, 09.
  15. Damien NEVEN & Paul SEABRIGHT, 1995. "Trade Liberalisation and the Co-ordination of Competition Policy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9503, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  16. Neven, Damien J, 1992. "Regulatory Reform in the European Community," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 98-103, May.
  17. Gatsios, Konstantine & Seabright, Paul, 1989. "Regulation in the European Community," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 37-60, Summer.
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