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Merger Policies And Trade Liberalization

  • Horn, Henrik
  • Levinsohn, James A

As international economic integration has progressed, policy makers have started to ponder the possible conflicts arising from nationally pursued competition policies in more unified goods markets. An idea underlying much of this discussion is the notion that international trade liberalisation, by limiting countries' abilities to promote their self-interest with beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies, will induce countries to instead use competition policies to pursue the same goals. We argue that one should not expect to find any particular relationship between trade policy and merger policy. Thus, we find no theoretical presumption that international trade liberalisation induces countries to pursue merger policies that have more of a beggar-thy-neighbour flavour.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2459.

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Date of creation: May 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2459
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  1. Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-64, October.
  2. Auquier, A A & Caves, R E, 1979. "Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 559-81, September.
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  7. Damien NEVEN & Paul SEABRIGHT, 1995. "Trade Liberalisation and the Co-ordination of Competition Policy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9503, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  8. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Mavroidis, Petros C. & DEC, 1993. "Competition, competition policy, and the GATT," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1228, The World Bank.
  9. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-23, November.
  10. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September.
  11. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
  13. Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
  14. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
  15. Gatsios, Konstantine & Seabright, Paul, 1989. "Regulation in the European Community," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 37-60, Summer.
  16. Mark Rysman, 2000. "Competition Policy as Strategic Trade," Papers 0100, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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