An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy
I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-23, November.
- Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
- Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2000.
"The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 845-855, May.
- Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 1999. "The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International Antitrust," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9916, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1989.
"A Theory of Managed Trade,"
801, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James, 2001.
"Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 244-76, April.
- Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James A, 2000. "Merger Policies And Trade Liberalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Henrik Horn & James Levinsohn, 1997. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 6077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Horn, H. & Levinsohn, J., 1998. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization," Working Papers 420, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- Luis M. B. Cabral, 2001.
"Optimal Brand Umbrella Size,"
01-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Cabral, L.M.B., 2001. "Optimal Brand Umbrella Size," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 01-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
- Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-64, October.
- Cabral, Luis M. B., 2003. "International merger policy coordination," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 21-30, January.
- Spagnolo, G., 1999.
"On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
9914, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 127-139, November.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2001. "Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2008.
"Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 1-26, May.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007. "Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs," CEPR Discussion Papers 6159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2004. "Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs," Discussion Paper Series dp359, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Mark Rysman, 2000. "Competition Policy as Strategic Trade," Papers 0100, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
- Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
- Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2000. "Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Damien NEVEN & Paul SEABRIGHT, 1995. "Trade Liberalisation and the Co-ordination of Competition Policy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9503, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:03-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Viveca Licata)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.