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An Economic Perspective on the Jurisdictional Reform of the European Merger Control System

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  • Oliver Budzinski

    () (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Abstract

The jurisdictional elements of the comprehensive 2004 reform of EU merger control are worth being analysed against the background of economic theory. Competence allocation and delimitation represent important factors for the workability of multilevel merger control regimes. The economics of federalism offer an analytical framework that can be adopted in a modified version in order to assess competence allocation regimes in competition policy. According to these theoretical insights, a given competence allocation and delimitation regime can be evaluated in regard to four criteria: internalisation of externalities, cost efficiency (the one-stop-shop principle), preference orientation, and adaptability. The ‘old’ competence allocation and delimitation regime of EU merger control consisted of two elements: turnover thresholds and post-notification referrals. Analysis along the lines of the economics of federalism reveals considerable deficiencies of the ‘old’ regime. Thus, the results of the theoretical analysis are compatible to the dissatisfying empirical experience, which represented a major motivation for launching the reform process. However, the actual reform eventually left the turnover thresholds untouched. The main element of the jurisdictional reform was the introduction of pre-notification referrals and the addition of institutionalised network cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "An Economic Perspective on the Jurisdictional Reform of the European Merger Control System," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200608, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200608
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    File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2006-08
    File Function: First version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Budzinski Oliver & Kuchinke Björn A., 2012. "Deal or No Deal? Consensual Arrangements as an Instrument of European Competition Policy," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 63(3), pages 265-292, December.
    2. Oliver Budzinski & Katharina Wacker, 2007. "The Prohibition Of The Proposed Springer-Prosiebensat.1 Merger: How Much Economics In German Merger Control?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-306.
    3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2017. "Wettbewerbsregeln für das Digitale Zeitalter - Die Ökonomik personalisierter Daten, Verbraucherschutz und die 9. GWB-Novelle," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 108, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    4. Oliver Budzinski, 2011. "The Institutional Framework for Doing Sports Business: Principles of EU Competition Policy in Sports Markets," Working Papers 108/11, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.

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    Keywords

    competence allocation; economics of federalism; jurisdictional reform.;

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