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International antitrust institutions

  • Budzinski, Oliver

The paper discussed the economic theory of international antitrust institutions. Economic theory shows that non-coordinated competition policies of regimes that are territorially smaller than the international markets on which business companies compete violate cross-border allocative efficiency and are deficient with respect to global welfare. At the same time, some diversity of antitrust institutions and policies promotes dynamic and evolutionary efficiency so that globally binding, worldwide homogenous competition rules do not represent a first-best solution either. After reviewing the existing international antitrust institutions and their prospects and limits from an economic perspective (with a focus on the International Competition Network, ICN), the paper discusses reform proposals from economic literature.

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Paper provided by Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics in its series Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers with number 72.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:72
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  1. Jan Loecker & Jozef Konings & Patrick Cayseele, 2008. "Merger Review: How Much of Industry is Affected in an International Perspective?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, March.
  2. Smets, Hilde & van Cayseele, Patrick, 1995. "Competing merger policies in a common agency framework," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 425-441, December.
  3. Luis M. B. Cabral, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," Working Papers 03-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1999. "The Competition Between Competition Rules," NBER Working Papers 7273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Choi, Jay Pil & Gerlach, Heiko, 2012. "Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 528-540.
  6. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
  7. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "An international multilevel competition policy system," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 367-389, December.
  8. Budzinski, Oliver, 2007. "Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 158, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
  9. Wolfgang Kerber, . "An International Multi-Level System of Competition Laws: Federalism in Antitrust," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1065, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  10. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1983. "Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 23-50, April.
  11. Motta Massimo & Ruta Michele, 2008. "Mergers and National Champions," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 245-270.
  12. Oliver Budzinski, 2004. "The International Competition Network as an International Merger Control Institution," Chapters, in: International Institutions and Multinational Enterprises, chapter 4 Edward Elgar.
  13. Tay, Abigail & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "Why (no) global competition policy is a tough choice," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 312-324, May.
  14. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "The limits to competition between economic regimes," Munich Reprints in Economics 19845, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  15. Ross, Thomas W., 1988. "On the price effects of mergers with freer trade," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 233-246.
  16. Kenneth Heyer, 2006. "Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why not the Best?," EAG Discussions Papers 200608, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  17. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-23, November.
  18. Florian Muller & Christian Wey & Justus Haucap, 2006. "How to Reduce Conflicts over International Antitrust?," Conferences on New Political Economy, in: Max Albert & Stefan Voigt & Dieter Schmidtchen (ed.), Conferences on New Political Economy, edition 1, volume 23, pages 307-338(3 Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
  19. Ken Heyer, 2006. "Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
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