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Efectos de la descentralización de la política de defensa de la competencia

Author

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  • Juan Luis Jiménez

    (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado, Saulo Torón,4,35017, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.Tfno.:928451792; Fax: 928458183)

  • Javier Campos

    (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado, Saulo Torón,4,35017, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.Tfno.:928451792; Fax: 928458183)

Abstract

En los últimos años, tanto en la Unión Europea como en España, se ha procedido a descentralizar algunos aspectos relevantes de la política de defensa de la competencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la interacción entre información y riesgo de captura asociada a esta nueva situación, partiendo de algunos modelos clásicos de regulación. Nuestros resultados confirman que, desde el punto de vista de los precios y la eficiencia productiva, la descentralización supone una mejora al incrementar la información que posee la agencia de la competencia sobre las empresas. Sin embargo, el riesgo de captura puede ser mayor, diluyendo así esa ventaja inicial y haciendo que la descentralización, especialmente, si no va acompañada de una independencia política de la agencia, no genere resultados globales mejores que los de la centralización.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Luis Jiménez & Javier Campos, 2004. "Efectos de la descentralización de la política de defensa de la competencia," Documentos de trabajo conjunto ULL-ULPGC 2004-09, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la ULPGC.
    • Handle: RePEc:can:series:2004-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Trillas, Francesc & Xifré, Ramon, 2016. "Institutional reforms to integrate regulation and competition policy: Economic analysis, international perspectives, and the case of the CNMC in Spain," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 75-87.

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