Contemporary International Cartels And Developing Countries: Economic Effects And Implications For Competition Policy
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14590
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Cited by:
- Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006.
"Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1185-1212, November.
- Joseph E Harrington Jr & Joe Chen, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," Economics Working Paper Archive 514, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Sep 2004.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Cécile Aubert, 2008.
"Managerial effort incentives and market collusion,"
Post-Print
hal-00382224, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert, 2009. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382709, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382714, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382711, HAL.
- Aubert, Cécile, 2009. "Managerial Effort Incentives and Market Collusion," TSE Working Papers 09-127, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2005.
"The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-358, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr & Joe Chen, 2005. "he Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path," Economics Working Paper Archive 528, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Prokop, Jacek, 2012. "Praktyka Zwalczania Karteli W Unii Europejskiej [The Practice Of Cartel Elimination In The European Union]," MPRA Paper 67126, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ajit Singh, 2014. "Competition, Competition Policy, Competitiveness, Globalisation & Development," Working Papers wp460, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015.
"How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 119-153, September.
- Boyer, Marcel & Kotchoni, Rachidi, 2014. "How Much Do Cartels Overcharge?," TSE Working Papers 14-462, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2015.
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015. "How Much Do Cartels Overcharge," Post-Print hal-01386061, HAL.
- Ajit Singh, 2016.
"Competition, competition policy, competitiveness, globalization and development,"
Chapters, in: Erik S. Reinert & Jayati Ghosh & Rainer Kattel (ed.), Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, chapter 35, pages 666-688,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Singh, Ajit, 2013. "Competition, Competition Policy, Competitiveness, Globalisation and Development," MPRA Paper 53027, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 13 Jan 2014.
- Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007.
"Collusion under monitoring of sales,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 314-331, June.
- Joseph E Harrington & Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Economics Working Paper Archive 509, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Harrington, Joseph E., 2005. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Research Papers 1885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Joseph E. Harrington & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011.
"Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2425-2449, October.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices," Economics Working Paper Archive 555, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Sylwester Bejger, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 4(1), pages 88-107, January.
- Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2004. "EXPORT CARTELS : A Developing Country Perspective," Working papers 120, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Bejger, Sylwester, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel- preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Marcel Boyer & Anne Catherine Faye & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2017.
"Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2017s-20, CIRANO.
- Boyer, Marcel & Faye, Anne Catherine & Kotchoni, Rachidi, 2017. "Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining," TSE Working Papers 17-852, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Pedro Mendi & Rafael Moner-Colonques & José Sempere-Monerris, 2011. "Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 359-378, September.
- Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "International antitrust institutions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 72, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011.
"The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2011s-35, CIRANO.
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011. "The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges," Working Papers hal-00631429, HAL.
- Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2012. "How Much Do Cartels Typically Overcharge?," CIRANO Working Papers 2012s-15, CIRANO.
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Keywords
International Development; International Relations/Trade;Statistics
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