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Contemporary International Cartels And Developing Countries: Economic Effects And Implications For Competition Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Levenstein, Margaret
  • Suslow, Valerie Y.
  • Oswald, Lynda J.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Levenstein, Margaret & Suslow, Valerie Y. & Oswald, Lynda J., 2003. "Contemporary International Cartels And Developing Countries: Economic Effects And Implications For Competition Policy," Working Papers 14590, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iatrwp:14590
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14590
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    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14590/files/wp03-10.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006. "Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1185-1212, November.
    2. Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382224, HAL.
    3. Joe Chen & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2005. "The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-358, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. Prokop, Jacek, 2012. "Praktyka Zwalczania Karteli W Unii Europejskiej
      [The Practice Of Cartel Elimination In The European Union]      ," MPRA Paper 67126, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ajit Singh, 2014. "Competition, Competition Policy, Competitiveness, Globalisation & Development," Working Papers wp460, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    6. Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015. "How Much Do Cartel Overcharge?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 119-153, September.
    7. Ajit Singh, 2016. "Competition, competition policy, competitiveness, globalization and development," Chapters, in: Erik S. Reinert & Jayati Ghosh & Rainer Kattel (ed.), Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, chapter 35, pages 666-688, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Collusion under monitoring of sales," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 314-331, June.
    9. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    10. Joseph E. Harrington & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2425-2449, October.
    11. Sylwester Bejger, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 4(1), pages 88-107, January.
    12. Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2004. "EXPORT CARTELS : A Developing Country Perspective," Working papers 120, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    13. repec:ags:pdcbeh:204188 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    15. Marcel Boyer & Anne Catherine Faye & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2017. "Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-20, CIRANO.
    16. Pedro Mendi & Rafael Moner-Colonques & José Sempere-Monerris, 2011. "Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 359-378, September.
    17. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "International antitrust institutions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 72, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    18. Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011. "The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-35, CIRANO.
    19. Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2012. "How Much Do Cartels Typically Overcharge?," CIRANO Working Papers 2012s-15, CIRANO.

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