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Merger Review: How much of Industry is Affected in an International Perspective ?

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  • Patrick Van Cayseele
  • Jozef Konings
  • Jan De Loecker

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  • Patrick Van Cayseele & Jozef Konings & Jan De Loecker, 2003. "Merger Review: How much of Industry is Affected in an International Perspective ?," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0315, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Konings, Jozef & Van Cayseele, Patrick & Warzynski, Frederic, 2001. "The dynamics of industrial mark-ups in two small open economies: does national competition policy matter?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 841-859, April.
    2. Smets, Hilde & van Cayseele, Patrick, 1995. "Competing merger policies in a common agency framework," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 425-441, December.
    3. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Daniele Checchi & Alessandro Turrini, 2003. "Adjusting Labor Demand: Multinational Versus National Firms: A Cross-European Analysis," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 708-719, 04/05.
    4. Seldeslachts, Jo & Clougherty, Joseph A. & Barros, Pedro Pita, 2007. "Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 218, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2005. "Does antitrust policy improve consumer welfare? Assessing the evidence," Chapters, in: Colin Robinson (ed.), Governments, Competition and Utility Regulation, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Jozef Konings & Patrick Van Cayseele & Frederic Warzynski, 2005. "The Effects of Privatization and Competitive Pressure on Firms' Price-Cost Margins: Micro Evidence from Emerging Economies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 124-134, February.
    7. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    8. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
    9. Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2007. "The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 455-489.
    10. Steven Brakman & Harry Garretsen & Charles van Marrewijk, 2006. "Comparative advantage, cross-border mergers and merger waves: International economics meets industrial organization," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(01), pages 22-26, April.
    11. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, August.
    2. Seldeslachts, Jo & Clougherty, Joseph A. & Barros, Pedro Pita, 2007. "Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 218, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Patrick Van Cayseele, 2007. "Some Reflections on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Multijurisdictional Antitrust Enforcement in Europe," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 5(3), pages 23-27, October.
    4. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "International antitrust institutions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 72, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    5. repec:ces:ifodic:v:5:y:2007:i:3:p:14567328 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Thomas G. Wollmann, 2020. "How to Get Away with Merger: Stealth Consolidation and Its Effects on US Healthcare," NBER Working Papers 27274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Budzinski, Oliver, 2020. "The economics of international competition policy: New challenges in the light of digitization?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 135, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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