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Divergierende Fallentscheidungen von Wettbewerbsbehörden: Institutionelle Hintergründe

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  • Neugebauer, Andrea

Abstract

Bei der Kooperation und bei der Fusion von Unternehmen stellt sich immer auch die Frage, ob wirtschaftliche Macht entsteht. Eine solche kö nnte zu Lasten von Wirtschaftssubjekten genutzt werden, die nicht an der Kooperation/Fusion beteiligt, aber davon betroffen sind. Es geht vor allem um konkurrierende Unternehmen und um die Marktgegenseite. Die Wettbewerbspolitik soll marktbeherrschende Stellungen und die Einschränkung des Wettbewerbs durch Unternehmenskonzentration verhindern. Sowohl die Ausgestaltung wettbewerbspolitischer Regelungen durch die Politik als auch die Entscheidung konkreter Fälle durch die Wettbewerbsbehö rden sind der interessengeleiteten Einflussnahme unterschiedlicher Gruppen ausgesetzt. Wettbewerbspolitik findet nicht im luftleeren Raum statt. Dieser Zusammenhang, der eine politö konomische Analyse der Wettbewerbspolitik nahe legt, gilt bereits auf nationaler Ebene. Er gewinnt jedoch eine zusätzliche Dimension mit dem Fortschreiten der Internationalisierung des Wirtschaftens. Da in diesem Prozess auch Kooperationen und Fusionen grenzüberschreitend werden, kö nnen mehrere Behö rden für konkrete Fälle zuständig sein. Nun kommt zum Tragen, dass die Wettbewerbstheorie keine eindeutigen Schlussforderungen für die Ausgestaltung der Politik zulässt und dass der institutionelle Hintergrund die Entscheidungen beeinflusst. Dies kann dazu führen, dass Wettbewerbsbehö rden zu abweichenden Fallentscheidungen kommen. Für die betroffenen Unternehmen ist diese mit Unsicherheit verbunden, die Transaktionskosten verursacht und wohlfahrtsfö rdernde Kooperationen verhindern kann. Im vorliegenden Arbeitspapier Nr. 26 zeigt Andrea Neugebauer die Hintergründe auf, die zu divergierenden Fallentscheidungen bei internationalen Kooperationen/Fusionen führen können und stellt ihre Überlegungen zur Diskussion. Weitere Arbeiten mit zusätzlichen Aspekten werden folgen.

Suggested Citation

  • Neugebauer, Andrea, 2002. "Divergierende Fallentscheidungen von Wettbewerbsbehörden: Institutionelle Hintergründe," Arbeitspapiere 26, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:26
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