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Interest Groups: An Introduction

Author

Listed:
  • Filip Palda

    (École nationale d'administration publique in MOntreal)

Abstract

This paper reviews public choice theories of interest groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Filip Palda, 2002. "Interest Groups: An Introduction," Public Economics 0209006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0209006
    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM-PC; to print on HP;
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0209/0209006.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1982. "A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 671-688, May.
    4. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1990. "The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 103-131, April.
    5. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, Enero-Abr.
    6. Werner W. Pommerehne & Bruno S. Frey, 1976. "Two Approaches To Estimating Public Expenditures," Public Finance Review, , vol. 4(4), pages 395-407, October.
    7. Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
    8. Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
    9. Filip Palda, 1997. "Fiscal Churning and Political Efficiency," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 189-206, May.
    10. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

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