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Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly

  • Gjermund Nese


  • Odd Straume


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    We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 31-52

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:31-52
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