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Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?

The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163594
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Paper provided by Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2005/8.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 30 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2005_008
Contact details of provider: Postal: NHH, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Phone: +47 55 95 92 93
Fax: +47 55 95 96 50
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/en/research-faculty/department-of-business-and-management-science.aspx
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  1. Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53, January.
  2. Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March.
  3. Giacomo Calzolari, 2004. "Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 257-282, 02.
  4. Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2003. "Strategic Choice of Financing Systems in Regulated and Interconnected Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
  6. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Merger profitability and trade policy
    [Fusionen und Handelspolitik]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-12, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  7. Ziss, Steffen, 1995. "Vertical Separation and Horizontal Mergers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 63-75, March.
  8. Olsen, T.E. & Osmundsen, P., 1998. "Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership," Papers 11/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  9. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August.
  10. Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2326, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Haaparanta, Pertti, 1996. "Competition for foreign direct investments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 141-153, December.
  12. Calzolari, Giacomo, 2001. "The Theory and Practice of Regulation with Multinational Enterprises," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 191-211, September.
  13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
  14. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Nese, Gjermund & Straume, Odd Rune, 2004. "Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly," Working Papers in Economics 10/04, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  16. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2003. "Spillovers and international competition for investments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 211-238, January.
  17. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Bargaining, Vertical Contracts," Economics Working Papers we051507, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  18. Konrad, Kai A. & Erik Lommerud, Kjell, 2001. "Foreign direct investment, intra-firm trade and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 475-494, March.
  19. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2005. "Downstream merger with upstream market power," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 717-743, April.
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