Spillovers and international competition for investments
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Blomstrom, Magnus & Kokko, Ari, 1998.
" Multinational Corporations and Spillovers,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 247-277, July.
- Blomström, Magnus & Kokko, Ari, 1996. "Multinational Corporations and Spillovers," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 99, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Blomström, Magnus & Kokko, Ari, 1996. "Multinational Corporations and Spillovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1365, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Working papers 368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
- Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
- Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Biglaiser Gary & Mezzetti Claudio, 1993. "Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 302-330, December.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Erik Lommerud, Kjell, 2001. "Foreign direct investment, intra-firm trade and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 475-494, March.
- Konrad, K.A. & Lommerud, K.E., 2001. "Foreign Direct Investment, Intra-firm Trade and Ownership Structure," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 219, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- James R. Markusen, 1995. "The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 169-189, Spring.
- Michael Devereux & Harold Freeman, 1995. "The impact of tax on foreign direct investment: Empirical evidence and the implications for tax integration schemes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(1), pages 85-106, February.
- Haaparanta, Pertti, 1996. "Competition for foreign direct investments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 141-153, December.
- Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2001. "Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-277, August.
- Olsen, T.E. & Osmundsen, P., 1998. "Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership," Papers 11/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Trond Olsen & Petter Osmundsen, 2000. "Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership," CESifo Working Paper Series 281, CESifo Group Munich.
- Calzolari, Giacomo, 2001. "The Theory and Practice of Regulation with Multinational Enterprises," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 191-211, September.
- Claudio Mezzetti, 1997. "Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 323-345, Summer.
- David Martimort, 1996. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Martimort, D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery," Papers 92.278, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Martimort, David, 1994. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," IDEI Working Papers 43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
- Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
- Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53, January.
- Osmundsen, P. & Hagen, K. P. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Internationally mobile firms and tax policy1," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-113, June.
- Olsen, T.E. & Osmundsen, P., 1999. "Common Agency with Outside Options; the Case of International Taxation of an MNE," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1999, Department of Economics, University of Bergen. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:59:y:2003:i:1:p:211-238. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.