Vertical Separation and Horizontal Mergers
The author considers a duopoly setting consisting of two manufacturer-retailer pairs in which the observable contract between each manufacturer-retailer pair specifies a two-part tariff. Without intraband competition, the author shows that an upstream merger is anticompetitive under very general demand and cost conditions. Downstream merger is analyzed using linear demand and constant marginal cost and is shown not to be anticompetitive both with and without intraband competition and for both price and output competition between retailers in the premerger regime. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 43 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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