IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v16y1983i2p288-98.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rent-Extracting Tariffs and the Management of Exhaustible Resources

Author

Listed:
  • James Brander
  • Slobodan Djajic

Abstract

The paper examines the interaction between a resource-exporting and a resource-importing country. The exporter chooses an optimal depletion rate and decides the allocation of the extracted resource between exports and domestic use. Optimal management from a national view entails inefficiency from a global perspective because too little resource is exported since the supplying country exploits its monopoly power. The importing country, however, has incentive to extract some of the resource rent with a tariff. The optimal tariff induces greater overall inefficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • James Brander & Slobodan Djajic, 1983. "Rent-Extracting Tariffs and the Management of Exhaustible Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 288-298, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:16:y:1983:i:2:p:288-98
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28198305%2916%3A2%3C288%3ARTATMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001. "Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
    2. Bretschger, Lucas & Valente, Simone, 2012. "Endogenous growth, asymmetric trade and resource dependence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 301-311.
    3. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
    4. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2016. "Second-best carbon taxation in the global economy: The Green Paradox and carbon leakage revisited," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 85-105.
    5. Keutiben, Octave, 2014. "On capturing foreign oil rents," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 542-555.
    6. Coulomb, Renaud & Henriet, Fanny, 2018. "The Grey Paradox: How fossil-fuel owners can benefit from carbon taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 206-223.
    7. Lucas Bretschger & Simone Valente, 2010. "Endogenous Growth, Asymmetric Trade and Resource Taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 10/132, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    8. Julien Daubanes & André Grimaud, 2010. "Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource in the Heterogeneous World," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(4), pages 567-588, December.
    9. Daubanes, Julien, 2009. "Taxation of Oil Products and GDP Dynamics of Oil-Rich Countries," TSE Working Papers 09-012, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Larry Karp & Sauleh Siddiqui & Jon Strand, 2016. "Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-strategic Agents: Taxes Versus Quantities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 135-158, September.
    11. Shengbao Ji & Yin-Fang Zhang & Tooraj Jamasb, 2014. "Reform of the Coal Sector in an Open Economy: The Case of China," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1445, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
    13. DAUBANES Julien & GRIMAUD André, 2006. "On the North-South Effects of Environmental Policy: Rent Transfers, Relocation and Growth," LERNA Working Papers 06.26.219, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    14. Johannes Pfeiffer, 2017. "Fossil Resources and Climate Change – The Green Paradox and Resource Market Power Revisited in General Equilibrium," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 77, April.
    15. Santiago J. Rubio, 2004. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited," Working Papers 2004.133, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March.
    17. Christian Beermann, 2015. "Climate Policy and the Intertemporal Supply of Fossil Resources," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 62, April.
    18. Santiago J. Rubio, 2005. "Tariff Agreements And Non-Renewable Resource International Monopolies: Prices Versus Quantitites," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    19. Santiago Rubio, 2011. "On Capturing Rent from a Non-renewable Resource International Monopoly: Prices Versus Quantities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 558-580, December.
    20. Florian Habermacher, 2015. "Carbon Leakage: A Medium- and Long-Term View," CESifo Working Paper Series 5216, CESifo.
    21. James A. Brander, 1989. "Taxation of Foreign-Owned Land," NBER Working Papers 3070, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Julien Daubanes & Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2009. "Prendre d'une main et donner de l'autre : taxation des produits pétroliers et aide internationale," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 21-37.
    23. Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March.
    24. BERLINSCHI Ruxanda & DAUBANES Julien, 2007. "Aid to Poor Resource Exporting Countries : Which Role Should be Played by Resource Taxation?," LERNA Working Papers 07.23.244, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    25. Wie, Jiegen & Wennlock, Magnus & Johansson, Daniel J.A. & Sterner, Thomas, 2011. "The Fossil Endgame: Strategic Oil Price Discrimination and Carbon Taxation," RFF Working Paper Series dp-11-26, Resources for the Future.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:16:y:1983:i:2:p:288-98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.