Tariff Agreements And Non-Renewable Resource International Monopolies: Prices Versus Quantitites
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More about this item
Keywordstariffs; tariff agreements; non-renewable resources; depletion effects; price-setting monopolist; quantity-setting monopolist; differential games; open-loop strategies; linear strategies; Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium; Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2006-02-05 (International Trade)
- NEP-MIC-2006-02-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-05 (Public Economics)
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