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Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources

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  • Karp, Larry

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  • Karp, Larry, 1984. "Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 73-97, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:8:y:1984:i:1:p:73-97
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    Cited by:

    1. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1996. "Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 205-220, September.
    2. Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001. "Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
    3. Santiago J. Rubio, 2004. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited," Working Papers 2004.133, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Quentin Grafton, R. & Kompas, Tom & Van Long, Ngo, 2012. "Substitution between biofuels and fossil fuels: Is there a green paradox?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 328-341.
    5. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1996. "Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 315-330, October.
    6. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
    7. Keutiben, Octave, 2014. "On capturing foreign oil rents," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 542-555.
    8. Sibel Sirakaya & Stephen J. Turnovsky & Nedim M. Alemdar, 2009. "Trade, Growth, and Environmental Quality ," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 906-926, November.
    9. Santiago J. Rubio, 2005. "Tariff Agreements And Non-Renewable Resource International Monopolies: Prices Versus Quantitites," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    10. Seiichi KATAYAMA & Ngo Van LONG & Hiroshi OHTA, 2013. "Carbon Taxes in a Trading World," GSICS Working Paper Series 26, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University.
    11. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement: Carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 202-218.
    12. Larry Karp & Sauleh Siddiqui & Jon Strand, 2016. "Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-strategic Agents: Taxes Versus Quantities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 135-158, September.
    13. Olli Tahvonen, 1995. "International CO 2 taxation and the dynamics of fossil fuel markets," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 261-278, August.
    14. Santiago Rubio, 2011. "On Capturing Rent from a Non-renewable Resource International Monopoly: Prices Versus Quantities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 558-580, December.
    15. Boyce, John R. & Vojtassak, Lucia, 2008. "An 'oil'igopoly theory of exploration," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 428-454, August.
    16. Max Franks & Ottmar Edenhofer & Kai Lessmann, 2017. "Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even If They Do Not Take Climate Change into Account," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(3), pages 445-472, November.
    17. repec:spr:lsprsc:v:11:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s12076-018-0201-x is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Florian Habermacher, 2015. "Carbon Leakage: A Medium- and Long-Term View," CESifo Working Paper Series 5216, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Jan Siegmeier & Linus Mattauch & Max Franks & David Klenert & Anselm Schultes & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2015. "A Public Finance Perspective on Climate Policy: Six Interactions That May Enhance Welfare," Working Papers 2015.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    20. Florian Habermacher, 2016. "Externalities in Risky Resource Markets - Optimal Taxes, Leakage and Divestment," CESifo Working Paper Series 5865, CESifo Group Munich.
    21. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Bergman, Lars, 2005. "International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process," MPRA Paper 10624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
    23. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of a Quantity Setting Cartel," CESifo Working Paper Series 3721, CESifo Group Munich.
    24. Liski, Matti & Tahvonen, Olli, 2004. "Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-12, January.

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