Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-strategic Agents: Taxes Versus Quantities
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Karp, Larry & Siddiqui, Sauleh & Strand, Jon, 2013. "Dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6679, The World Bank.
References listed on IDEAS
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 2011. "End of the line: A Note on Environmental Policy and Innovation when Governments cannot Commit," Documentos de Trabajo 394, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Montero, Juan Pablo, 2011. "A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(S1), pages 13-19.
- Matthias Kalkuhl & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2010. "Prices vs. Quantities and the Intertemporal Dynamics of the Climate Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 3044, CESifo Group Munich.
- Amundsen, Eirik S. & Schob, Ronnie, 1999.
"Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 311-329, June.
- Amundsen, E.S. & Schob, R., 1999. "Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 192, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Wirl, Franz, 2012. "Global warming: Prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 217-229.
- Strand, Jon, 2013.
"Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement: Carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 202-218.
- Strand, Jon, 2011. "Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement : carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5675, The World Bank.
- Edward Tower, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 623-630.
- James Brander & Slobodan Djajic, 1983.
"Rent-Extracting Tariffs and the Management of Exhaustible Resources,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 288-298, May.
- James Brander & Slobodan Djajic, 1982. "Rent-Extracting Tariffs and the Management of Exhaustible Resources," Working Papers 468, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Karp, Larry & Newbery, David M., 1991. "Optimal tariffs on exhaustible resources," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 285-299, May.
- Franz Wirl, 1995. "The exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes: A dynamic game approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(4), pages 333-352, June.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1983. "The multi-country transfer problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 49-53.
- Karp, Larry, 1984. "Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 73-97, October.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1982. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 194-201, March.
- Liski, Matti & Tahvonen, Olli, 2004. "Can carbon tax eat OPEC's rents?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-12, January.
- Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2009. "A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 2741, CESifo Group Munich.
- Santiago J. Rubio, 2005. "Tariff Agreements And Non-Renewable Resource International Monopolies: Prices Versus Quantitites," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2016. "Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 1-4, September.
- repec:eee:jeeman:v:89:y:2018:i:c:p:153-167 is not listed on IDEAS
- van der Meijden, Gerard & Ryszka, Karolina & Withagen, Cees, 2018. "Double limit pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 153-167.
- Nachtigall, Daniel, 2017. "Prices versus quantities: The impact of fracking on the choice of climate policy instruments in the presence of OPEC," Discussion Papers 2017/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Daniel Nachtigall, 2017. "Prices versus Quantities: The Impact of Fracking on the Choice of Climate Policy Instruments in the Presence of OPEC," Working Papers 2017001, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
- Karolina Ryszka & Cees Withagen, 2016. "Unilateral Climate Policies: Incentives and Effects," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 471-504, February.
More about this item
KeywordsDynamic game; Fossil fuel markets; Market power; Climate damages; Nonstrategic fringe;
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:65:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9901-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.