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Prices vs. Quantities and the Intertemporal Dynamics of the Climate Rent

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  • Matthias Kalkuhl
  • Ottmar Edenhofer

Abstract

This paper provides a formal survey of price and quantity instruments for mitigating global warming. We explicitly consider policies’ impact on the incentives of resource owners who maximize their profits intertemporally. We focus on the informational and commitment requirements of the regulator. Furthermore, we study the interplay between (private) resource extraction rent and (public) climate rent and ask how property and management of the climate rent can be assigned between regulator and resource sector. There are only two instruments that unburden the regulator from the complex intertemporal management of the climate rent and associated commitment problems: in the cost-benefit world, we derive a stock-dependent tax rule; in the cost-effective (carbon budget) world, only an emissions trading scheme with free banking and borrowing can shift intertemporal timing decisions completely to the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Kalkuhl & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2010. "Prices vs. Quantities and the Intertemporal Dynamics of the Climate Rent," CESifo Working Paper Series 3044, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3044
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Edenhofer, Ottmar & Kalkuhl, Matthias, 2011. "When do increasing carbon taxes accelerate global warming? A note on the green paradox," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2208-2212, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Habermacher, 2015. "Carbon Leakage: A Medium- and Long-Term View," CESifo Working Paper Series 5216, CESifo.
    2. Larry Karp & Sauleh Siddiqui & Jon Strand, 2016. "Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-strategic Agents: Taxes Versus Quantities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 135-158, September.
    3. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Ru¨diger, 2013. "Flattening the carbon extraction path in unilateral cost-effective action," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 185-201.
    4. Florian Habermacher, 2016. "Externalities in Risky Resource Markets - Optimal Taxes, Leakage and Divestment," CESifo Working Paper Series 5865, CESifo.
    5. Flachsland, Christian & Brunner, Steffen & Edenhofer, Ottmar & Creutzig, Felix, 2011. "Climate policies for road transport revisited (II): Closing the policy gap with cap-and-trade," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2100-2110, April.
    6. Edenhofer, Ottmar & Kalkuhl, Matthias, 2011. "When do increasing carbon taxes accelerate global warming? A note on the green paradox," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2208-2212, April.
    7. Kalkuhl, Matthias & Edenhofer, Ottmar & Lessmann, Kai, 2012. "Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-23.
    8. Niklas Döbbeling-Hildebrandt & Klaas Miersch & Tarun M. Khanna & Marion Bachelet & Stephan B. Bruns & Max Callaghan & Ottmar Edenhofer & Christian Flachsland & Piers M. Forster & Matthias Kalkuhl & Ni, 2024. "Systematic review and meta-analysis of ex-post evaluations on the effectiveness of carbon pricing," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 15(1), pages 1-12, December.
    9. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2011. "Unilateral reduction of medium-term carbon emissions via taxing emissions and consumption," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 152-11, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    10. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2015. "Unilateral Climate Policy with Production-Based and Consumption-Based Carbon Emission Taxes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(2), pages 141-163, June.
    11. Kum Yeen Wong & Joon Huang Chuah & Chris Hope, 2019. "As an emerging economy, should Malaysia adopt carbon taxation?," Energy & Environment, , vol. 30(1), pages 91-108, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    resource extraction; climate rent; intertemporal policy instruments; prices vs. quantities; Hotelling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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