IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ioe/doctra/394.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

End of the line: A Note on Environmental Policy and Innovation when Governments cannot Commit

Author

Listed:
  • Juan-Pablo Montero

    () (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

Abstract

It is widely accepted that one of the most important characteristics of an effective climate policy is to provide firms with credible incentives to make long-run investments in R&D that can drastically reduce emissions. Recognizing that a government may be tempted to revise its policy design after innovations become available, this note shows how the performance of two policy instruments –prices (uniform taxes) and quantities (tradeable pollution permits)– differ in such a setting.I also discuss the gains from combining either instrument with subsidies to adopting firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan-Pablo Montero, 2011. "End of the line: A Note on Environmental Policy and Innovation when Governments cannot Commit," Documentos de Trabajo 394, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:394
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/dt_394.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carrión-Flores, Carmen E. & Innes, Robert, 2010. "Environmental innovation and environmental performance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 27-42, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Larry Karp & Sauleh Siddiqui & Jon Strand, 2016. "Dynamic Climate Policy with Both Strategic and Non-strategic Agents: Taxes Versus Quantities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 135-158, September.
    2. David Tobón Orozco & Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa, 2011. "Un modelo de equilibrio general con externalidades y capital natural," Libros del Grupo Microeconomía Aplicada, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, edition 1, number 01.
    3. Aalbers, Rob & Shestalova, Victoria & Kocsis, Viktória, 2013. "Innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1240-1250.
    4. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018. "Time-inconsistent environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm: tradable permits versus emission tax," MPRA Paper 86407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Wirl, Franz, 2012. "Global warming: Prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 217-229.
    6. Moner-Colonques Rafael & Rubio Santiago J., 2016. "The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Environmental Policy: Taxes versus Standards," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 973-1000, April.
    7. Clancy, Matthew & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2016. "Pushing and Pulling Environmental Innovation: R&D Subsidies and Carbon Taxes," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235710, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    8. repec:spr:envpol:v:20:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10018-017-0185-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:eee:pubeco:v:160:y:2018:i:c:p:14-32 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Kellogg, Ryan, 2018. "Gasoline price uncertainty and the design of fuel economy standards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 14-32.
    11. Taran Faehn and Elisabeth T. Isaksen, 2016. "Diffusion of Climate Technologies in the Presence of Commitment Problems," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    12. Jean-Philippe Nicolaï, 2015. "Environmental regulation with and without commitment under irreversible investments," Working Papers 2015.19, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pollution control; innovation; commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:394. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jaime Casassus). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iepuccl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.