End of the line: A Note on Environmental Policy and Innovation when Governments cannot Commit
It is widely accepted that one of the most important characteristics of an effective climate policy is to provide firms with credible incentives to make long-run investments in R&D that can drastically reduce emissions. Recognizing that a government may be tempted to revise its policy design after innovations become available, this note shows how the performance of two policy instruments –prices (uniform taxes) and quantities (tradeable pollution permits)– differ in such a setting.I also discuss the gains from combining either instrument with subsidies to adopting firms.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (562) 354-4303
Fax: (562) 553-1664
Web page: http://www.economia.puc.clEmail:
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carrión-Flores, Carmen E. & Innes, Robert, 2010. "Environmental innovation and environmental performance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 27-42, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:394. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jaime Casassus)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.