A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit
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More about this item
KeywordsInnovation; Pollution; Commitment;
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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