Cake-Eating with Private Information
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andrade de Sá, Saraly & Daubanes, Julien, 2016.
"Limit pricing and the (in)effectiveness of the carbon tax,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 28-39.
- Saraly Andrade de Sá & Julien Daubanes, 2014. "Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax," CESifo Working Paper Series 5058, CESifo Group Munich.
- Saraly Andrade de Sa & Julien Daubanes, 2014. "Limit-Pricing and the Un(Effectiveness) of the Carbon Tax," OxCarre Working Papers 136, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
More about this item
Keywordsexhaustible resources; asymmetric information; resource dependence;
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
- O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
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