International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the resource rent distribution aspect of the Kyoto process. The paper focuses on the “battle for resource rents” with oil consuming countries on one side and oil producing countries on the other. Our analysis is carried out within the framework of a theoretical model of resource extraction over time. In particular, it is shown how CO2 emission caps may be used by the oil consuming countries, acting under the realm of the Kyoto process, to maximize the rent acquisition from oil producing countries and how the oil producing countries may constrain this possibility by exercising market power. The paper also compiles data and numerical results regarding the order of magnitudes of resource rents redistribution.
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