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International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process

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  • Amundsen, Eirik S.
  • Bergman, Lars

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the resource rent distribution aspect of the Kyoto process. The paper focuses on the “battle for resource rents” with oil consuming countries on one side and oil producing countries on the other. Our analysis is carried out within the framework of a theoretical model of resource extraction over time. In particular, it is shown how CO2 emission caps may be used by the oil consuming countries, acting under the realm of the Kyoto process, to maximize the rent acquisition from oil producing countries and how the oil producing countries may constrain this possibility by exercising market power. The paper also compiles data and numerical results regarding the order of magnitudes of resource rents redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Amundsen, Eirik S. & Bergman, Lars, 2005. "International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process," MPRA Paper 10624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10624
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Snorre Kverndokk & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2000. "Stabilization of CO2 concentrations: mitigation scenarios using the Petro model," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 3(2), pages 195-224, June.
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    5. Maskin, Eric S & Newbery, David M, 1990. "Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 143-156, March.
    6. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1982. "On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 194-201, March.
    7. Larry Karp & David M. Newbery, 1992. "Dynamically Consistent Oil Import Tariffs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-21, February.
    8. Deacon Robert T., 1993. "Taxation, Depletion, and Welfare: A Simulation Study of the U.S. Petroleum Resource," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 159-187, March.
    9. Karp, Larry, 1984. "Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 73-97, October.
    10. Karp, Larry & Newbery, David M, 1991. "OPEC and the U.S. Oil Import Tariff," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(405), pages 303-313, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pichler, Eva & Böheim, Michael H., 2013. "Excise taxes on gasoline and suppliers’ market power: A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 110-112.
    2. Daniel J.A. Johansson & Christian Azar & Kristian Lindgren & Tobias A. Persson, 2009. "OPEC Strategies and Oil Rent in a Climate Conscious World," The Energy Journal, , vol. 30(3), pages 23-50, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resource rents; environmental taxes; market form;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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