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Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of a Quantity Setting Cartel

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  • Kenji Fujiwara
  • Ngo Van Long

Abstract

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting cartel. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both players are better off if the importing country is the leader. The follower is worse off if the exporting cartel is the leader. Among the three game-theoretic outcomes, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country’s leadership.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of a Quantity Setting Cartel," CESifo Working Paper Series 3721, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3721
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001. "Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
    2. Karp, Larry & Newbery, David M., 1991. "Optimal tariffs on exhaustible resources," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 285-299, May.
    3. James L. Smith, 2009. "World Oil: Market or Mayhem?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 145-164, Summer.
    4. Larry Karp & David M. Newbery, 1992. "Dynamically Consistent Oil Import Tariffs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-21, February.
    5. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
    6. Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2010. "A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 18(4), pages 491-509, December.
    7. Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2010. "A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 18(4), pages 491-509, December.
    8. Karp, Larry, 1984. "Optimality and consistency in a differential game with non-renewable resources," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 73-97, October.
    9. Tahvonen, Olli, 1996. "Trade with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-17, January.
    10. Wirl Franz, 1994. "Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benchekroun, H. & Benchekroun, S., 2015. "Harvests' lifespan and North–South market share rivalry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 114-124.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic game; exhaustible resource; Stackelberg leadership; optimal tariff;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment

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