Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of Quantity Setting
Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two di erent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both countries are better o if the importing country is a leader, but that the follower becomes worse o if the exporting country is a leader. Consequently, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2012|
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