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Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

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  • Claudio Piga

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Abstract

The paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists' accommodations. First, a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered. In each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development, whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit. Linear Perfect Markov strategies are derived for both the non-cooperative and the public monopoly case. In equilibrium, a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly. Furthermore, the more the monopolist discounts the future, the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced. Second, the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure. The tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use. However, its combined effect with another policy instrument such as a quota, induces the optimal level of resource use. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Piga, 2003. "Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 343-359, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:26:y:2003:i:3:p:343-359
    DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000003544.77701.01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karl-Göran Mäler & Aart De Zeeuw, 1998. "The Acid Rain Differential Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(2), pages 167-184, September.
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    5. Claudio Piga, 2003. "Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 343-359, November.
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    14. Font, Antoni Riera, 2000. "Mass Tourism and the Demand for Protected Natural Areas: A Travel Cost Approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-116, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Malgorzata Ogonowska & Dominique Torre, 2014. "Towards a Sustainable Tourism," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-45, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    2. Birgit Bednar-Friedl & Doris Behrens & Michael Getzner, 2012. "Optimal Dynamic Control of Visitors and Endangered Species in a National Park," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(1), pages 1-22, May.
    3. Jacqueline M. Hamilton & Richard S.J. Tol, 2004. "The Impact Of Climate Change On Tourism And Recreation," Working Papers FNU-52, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Nov 2004.
    4. Claudio Piga, 2003. "Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 343-359, November.
    5. Guido Candela & Roberto Cellini, 2006. "Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(1), pages 41-58, September.
    6. Candela, Guido & Castellani, Massimiliano & Mussoni, Maurizio, 2012. "Clashes and compromises: Investment policies in tourism destinations," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 6, pages 1-25.
    7. repec:rim:rimwps:50-07 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Schubert, Stefan Franz, 2009. "Coping with Externalities in Tourism - A Dynamic Optimal Taxation Approach," MPRA Paper 16736, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Bonham, Carl & Gangnes, Byron & Zhou, Ting, 2009. "Modeling tourism: A fully identified VECM approach," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 531-549, July.
    10. Andrea Bigano & Alessandra Goria & Jacqueline Hamilton & Richard S.J. Tol, 2005. "The Effect of Climate Change and Extreme Weather Events on Tourism," Working Papers 2005.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani & Maurizio Mussoni, 2007. "Second Homes vs. Hotels: A Suggestion for a Self-enforcing Policy," Working Paper series 50_07, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    12. Denis Claude & Georges Zaccour, 2009. "Investment in Tourism Market and Reputation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 797-817, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    differential game; land use; taxation; tourism;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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