Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Rubio, Santiago J., 2016.
"The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly,"
ET: Economic Theory
244532, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Guiomar Martín-Herrán & Santiago J. Rubio, 2016. "The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly," Working Papers 2016.58, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Calvo, Emilio & Rubio, Santiago J., 2013.
"Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach,"
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics,
now publishers, vol. 6(4), pages 289-339, April.
- Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
More about this item
KeywordsInternational duopoly; Global environment; Environmental policy; Differential game; C73; F12; Q28;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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