Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock (Revised version, August 2008)
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary conditions that allow us to characterise Markov perfect Nash equilibria for these games. These conditions result in an auxiliary system of ordinary differential equations that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentiability of these equilibria. The techniques are used to derive detailed properties of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria for several games including the exploitation of a finite resource, the voluntary investment in a public capital stock, and the inter-temporal consumption of a reproductive asset.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Dept. of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, NL - 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands|
Phone: + 31 20 525 52 58
Fax: + 31 20 525 52 83
Web page: http://www.fee.uva.nl/cendef/
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