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Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction

Author

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  • Achim Voss

    (University of Hamburg)

  • Mark Schopf

    (University of Paderborn)

Abstract

Consider a lobby group of exhaustible-resource suppliers, which bargains with the government over the extraction of an exhaustible resource and over contribution payments. We characterize the equilibrium extraction path and the development of contribution payments in time. The latter relates to the development of the conflict of interest between profit-maximization and welfare-maximization. Due to stock pollution damages, the government prefers a lower level of cumulative extraction than the lobby group in the long run. In the meantime, the resource suppliers’ aim to maximize profits implies that equilibrium extraction may be too slow to maximize welfare, while flow-pollution damages imply that it may be too fast.

Suggested Citation

  • Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2016. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers Dissertations 26, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pdn:dispap:26
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    Cited by:

    1. Kalk, Andrei & Sorger, Gerhard, 2023. "Climate policy under political pressure," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2014. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers CIE 80, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    3. Schopf, Mark & Voss, Achim, 2019. "Bargaining over natural resources: Governments between environmental organizations and extraction firms," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 208-240.
    4. Hagen, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2024. "Political influence on international climate agreements with border carbon adjustment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Policy; Exhaustible Resources; Political Economy; Lobbying; Nash Bargaining; Dynamic Programming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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