Forest Conservation - Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model
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Other versions of this item:
- Essi Eerola, 2004. "Forest Conservation – Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(4), pages 391-407, April.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gaoussou DIARRA & Sébastien MARCHAND, 2011.
"Does Pervasive Corruption Matter For Firm's Demand for Good Governance in Developing Countries?,"
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- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
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"Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Evidences from Deforestation,"
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- Laing, Timothy & Palmer, Charles, 2015.
"Economy-wide impacts of REDD when there is political influence,"
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- Timothy Laing & Charles Palmer, 2013. "Economy-wide impacts of REDD when there is political influence," GRI Working Papers 110, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
- Laing, Timothy & Palmer, Charles, 2015. "Economy-wide impacts of REDD when there is political influence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61601, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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- Philippe Delacote, 2011. "How concessions’ size may influence systemic corruption in forest harvesting: A theoretical assessment," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2011-05, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
More about this item
KeywordsFOREST POLICY ; GOVERNMENT ; ENVIRONMENT;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
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