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Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset

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  • Sorger, Gerhard

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  • Sorger, Gerhard, 2006. "Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 2637-2659, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:30:y:2006:i:12:p:2637-2659
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Kaneko, Mamoru & Nakamura, Kenjiro, 1979. "The Nash Social Welfare Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 423-435, March.
    5. Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix, 2000. "Can negotiations prevent fish wars?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1265-1280, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marín-Solano, Jesús, 2015. "Group inefficiency in a common property resource game with asymmetric players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 214-217.
    2. Bård Harstad, 2016. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 719-752.
    3. Francisco Cabo & Mabel Tidball, 2022. "Cooperation in a Dynamic Setting with Asymmetric Environmental Valuation and Responsibility," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 844-871, September.
    4. repec:gla:glaewp:2007_23 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Francesca Flamini, 2023. "The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-20, April.
    6. Anna Rettieva, 2022. "Dynamic Multicriteria Game with Pollution Externalities," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(22), pages 1-15, November.
    7. Costello, Christopher & Molina, Renato, 2021. "Transboundary marine protected areas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    8. Anna Castañer & Jesús Marín-Solano & Carmen Ribas, 2021. "A time consistent dynamic bargaining procedure in differential games with hterogeneous discounting," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 93(3), pages 555-584, June.
    9. Guthrie, Graeme, 2021. "A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    10. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2014. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers CIE 80, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    11. Francesca Flamini, 2020. "Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 121-153, November.
    12. Schopf, Mark & Voss, Achim, 2019. "Bargaining over natural resources: Governments between environmental organizations and extraction firms," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 208-240.
    13. Voss, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2021. "Lobbying over exhaustible-resource extraction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    14. Luis Alcalá & Fernando Tohmé & Carlos Dabús, 2019. "Strategic Growth with Recursive Preferences: Decreasing Marginal Impatience," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 314-365, June.
    15. Anna N. Rettieva, 2022. "Dynamic multicriteria games with asymmetric players," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 521-537, July.
    16. Elena M. Parilina & Puduru Viswanadha Reddy & Georges Zaccour, 2022. "Endogenous Duration of Long-term Agreements in Cooperative Dynamic Games with Nontransferable Utility," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 808-836, December.

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