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Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction

Author

Listed:
  • Achim Voss

    () (University of Muenster)

  • Mark Schopf

    () (University of Paderborn)

Abstract

Republished as CIE Working Paper 2017-10

Suggested Citation

  • Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2015. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers CIE 89, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:pdn:ciepap:89
    as

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    File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP108.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubio, Santiago J. & Escriche, Luisa, 2001. "Strategic pigouvian taxation, stock externalities and polluting non-renewable resources," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 297-313, February.
    2. Fischer, Carolyn & Laxminarayan, Ramanan, 2005. "Sequential development and exploitation of an exhaustible resource: do monopoly rights promote conservation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 500-515, May.
    3. Rubio Jorge Santiago J., 2007. "On Capturing Rent from a Non-Renewable Resource International Monopoly," Working Papers 201089, Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation.
    4. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2014. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers CIE 80, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    5. John Boyce, 2010. "Putting Foxes in Charge of the Hen-House: The Political Economy of Harvest Quota Regulations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 475-493, August.
    6. James L. Sweeney, 1977. "Economics of Depletable Resources: Market Forces and Intertemporal Bias," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 125-141.
    7. Hepburn, Cameron J. & Quah, John K.-H. & Ritz, Robert A., 2013. "Emissions trading with profit-neutral permit allocations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 85-99.
    8. Keutiben, Octave, 2014. "On capturing foreign oil rents," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 542-555.
    9. Julien Daubanes, 2008. "Fossil fuels supplied by oligopolies: On optimal taxation and rent capture," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(13), pages 1-11.
    10. Sorger, Gerhard, 2006. "Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 2637-2659, December.
    11. Schopf, Mark & Voss, Achim, 2016. "Bargaining over Natural Resources: Governments between Environmental Organizations and Extraction Firms," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145496, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2016. "Special Interest Politics: Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining," Working Papers Dissertations 27, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    13. Wirl Franz, 1994. "Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2014. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers CIE 80, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    2. Schopf, Mark & Voss, Achim, 2016. "Bargaining over Natural Resources: Governments between Environmental Organizations and Extraction Firms," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145496, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Policy; Exhaustible Resources; Political Economy; Lobbying; Nash Bargaining; Dynamic Programming;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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