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The Conservation Multiplier

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  • Bård Harstad

Abstract

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or conserve it and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation and of a donor compensating for conservation. A successful donor pays every period for each unit; a successful lobby pays once. This asymmetry causes inefficient exploitation. A normative analysis uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the party in power, to the general public, or to the lobby.

Suggested Citation

  • Bård Harstad, 2023. "The Conservation Multiplier," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(7), pages 1731-1771.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/723637
    DOI: 10.1086/723637
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "Politicians, Trust, Financial Literacy and Financial Education: When Do Politicians Care?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23208, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023. "Organizational capacity and project dynamics," Working Papers 339, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    3. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "Politicians, Trust and Financial Literacy: When Do Politicians Care?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23206, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Costa, Francisco J M & Szerman, Dimitri & Assunção, Juliano, 2024. "The Environmental Costs of Political Interference: Evidence from Power Plants in the Amazon," SocArXiv 6y7vk, Center for Open Science.
    5. Bård Harstad & Kjetil Storesletten, 2023. "Conservation by Lending," CESifo Working Paper Series 10533, CESifo.

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