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Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties

Author

Listed:
  • Bård Harstad
  • Anke Kessler
  • Anke S. Kessler

Abstract

We study how international environmental agreements can take advantage of domestic time-inconsistency problems. Policymakers often prefer future policies to be sustainable, but are tempted to invest less when being in office. We find the equilibrium number of signatory countries to be higher than when preferences are time consistent, especially when the political environment is unstable and polarized and the international spillovers are limited. This model also explains participation in treaties whose mandates do not vary with the coalition size and why the coalition will not unravel if, for example, the US exits the Paris Agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Bård Harstad & Anke Kessler & Anke S. Kessler, 2025. "Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties," CESifo Working Paper Series 11744, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11744
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Neumayer, 2002. "Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? A Cross-country Analysis," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(2), pages 139-164, March.
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    4. Aldy,Joseph E. & Stavins,Robert N. (ed.), 2009. "Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521137850, June.
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    7. Aldy,Joseph E. & Stavins,Robert N. (ed.), 2009. "Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521138000, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international treaties; time inconsistency; self-commitment; environmental policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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