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The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

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  • Marco Battaglini
  • Bård Harstad

Abstract

In recent decades, democratic countries have signed hundreds of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Most of these agreements, however, are weak: they generally do not include effective enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. This is a puzzle in standard economic models. To study this phenomenon, we propose a positive theory of IEAs in which the political incumbents negotiate them in the shadow of reelection concerns. We show that, in these environments, incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are simultaneously overambitious (larger than what they would be without electoral concerns) and weak (might not be implemented in full). The theory also provides a new perspective for understanding investments in green technologies, highlighting a channel through which countries are tempted to rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to make compliance credible. We present preliminary evidence consistent with these predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2016. "The Political Economy of Weak Treaties," NBER Working Papers 22968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22968
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    4. Bellelli, Francesco S. & Scarpa, Riccardo & Aftab, Ashar, 2023. "An empirical analysis of participation in international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
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    7. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    8. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2021. "Climate Policy and Moral Consumers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1190-1226, October.
    9. Fabien Candau & Tchapo Gbandi, 2023. "When Climate Change Determines International Agreements: Evidence from Water Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 85(3), pages 587-614, August.
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    11. Hofmann, Elisa & Kyriacou, Lucas & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2021. "A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 266, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    12. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2021. "Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 270, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    13. Jang, Dooseok & Patel, Amrish & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2018. "Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 85-99.
    14. Josse Delfgaauw & Otto H. Swank, 2023. "The Political Economy of Commitment to Policies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-060/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Bård Harstad, 2020. "Trade and Trees: How Trade Agreements Can Motivate Conservation Instead of Depletion," CESifo Working Paper Series 8569, CESifo.
    16. Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022. "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    17. Hofmann Elisa & Kyriacou Lucas & Schmidt Klaus M., 2023. "A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 243(5), pages 543-566, October.
    18. Bård Harstad, 2020. "The Conservation Multiplier," CESifo Working Paper Series 8283, CESifo.
    19. Arthur Fishman & Doron Klunover, 2020. "To Act or not to Act? Political competition in the presence of a threat," Papers 2010.03464, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
    20. Herkenhoff, Philipp & Krautheim, Sebastian, 2022. "The international organization of production in the regulatory void," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
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    22. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Believers vs. deniers: Climate change and environmental policy polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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