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Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements

Author

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  • Simon Dietz

    (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science)

  • Carmen Marchiori

    (Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science)

  • Alessandro Tavoni

    (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a strong analogy with the behaviour of an individual or firm in other strategic contexts. In reality, however, various domestic special interests shape environmental policy, including how national governments cooperate on cross-border issues. Therefore in this paper we introduce to a classic model of international environmental cooperation the phenomenon of domestic political competition, whereby lobby groups seek to influence policy by offering to fund political campaigning. We use the model to establish some general conditions for the effects of lobbying on the stringency of policy and the size of coalitions cooperating to provide an environmental good. Using specific functional forms, we obtain a range of further results, including circumstances in which the omission of lobbying results in environmental protection being underestimated.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Dietz & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandro Tavoni, 2012. "Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2012.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.76
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
    2. Stefano Carattini & Andrea Baranzini & Philippe Thalmann & Frédéric Varone & Frank Vöhringer, 2017. "Green Taxes in a Post-Paris World: Are Millions of Nays Inevitable?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(1), pages 97-128, September.
    3. Doda, Baran & Quemin, Simon & Taschini, Luca, 2019. "Linking permit markets multilaterally," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    4. Valentina Bosetti & Melanie Heugues & Alessandro Tavoni, 2017. "Luring others into climate action: coalition formation games with threshold and spillover effects," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 410-431.
    5. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    6. Doruk İriş, 2016. "Economic Targets And Loss-Aversion In International Environmental Cooperation," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 624-648, July.
    7. Stefano Carattini & Simon Levin & Alessandro Tavoni, 2019. "Cooperation in the Climate Commons," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(2), pages 227-247.
    8. Foucart, Renaud & Wan, Cheng, 2018. "Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 537-558.
    9. Andrea Baranzini & Stefano Carattini, 2017. "Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(1), pages 197-227, January.
    10. Maria Arvaniti & Wolfgang Habla, 2020. "The Political Economy of Negotiating International Carbon Markets," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 20/335, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    11. Fergus Green, 2015. "Nationally Self-Interested Climate Change Mitigation: A Unified Conceptual Framework," GRI Working Papers 199, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    12. Sauter, Caspar & Grether, Jean-Marie & Mathys, Nicole A., 2016. "Geographical spread of global emissions: Within-country inequalities are large and increasing," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 138-149.
    13. Cole, Matthew T. & Lake, James & Zissimos, Ben, 2021. "Contesting an international trade agreement," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    14. Simon Quemin & Christian Perthuis, 2019. "Transitional Restricted Linkage Between Emissions Trading Schemes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 1-32, September.
    15. Matsueda, Norimichi, 2020. "Collective vs. individual lobbying," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    16. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2018. "Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 43-55.
    17. Achim Hagen & Leonhard Kaehler & Klaus Eisenack, 2016. "Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors," Working Papers V-387-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2016.
    18. Greer Gosnell & Alessandro Tavoni, 2017. "A bargaining experiment on heterogeneity and side deals in climate negotiations," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 575-586, June.
    19. Sarah Spycher & Ralph Winkler, 2020. "Strategic Delegation in the Formation of Modest International Environmental Agreements," CESifo Working Paper Series 8769, CESifo.
    20. Achim Hagen & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016. "The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers V-391-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2016.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory; International Environmental Agreements; Lobbying; Special-Interest Groups; Strategic Cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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