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Coalition Formation and Voting in Public Goods Games

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  • Dannenberg, Astrid

Abstract

This study experimentally examines the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good when the coalition members use different voting schemes to determine their commitment. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting public good provision level and social welfare. At first sight, in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a change in the voting scheme implemented in a coalition does not significantly change the social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the coalition efforts alters the depth and breadth of cooperation; coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while coalitions with majority voting implement high effort levels but attract only a few participants.

Suggested Citation

  • Dannenberg, Astrid, 2012. "Coalition Formation and Voting in Public Goods Games," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 83-105, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000011
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000011
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    Cited by:

    1. Martinsson, Peter & Persson, Emil, 2016. "Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the institutional formation affect cooperation?," Working Papers in Economics 655, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    2. Gerber, Anke & Neitzel, Jakob & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2013. "Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 209-222.
    3. Simon Dietz & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandro Tavoni, 2012. "Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements," GRI Working Papers 87, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    4. Alfred Endres & Bianca Rundshagen, 2013. "Incentives to Diffuse Advanced Abatement Technology Under the Formation of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 177-210, October.
    5. Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2014. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions," Working Papers SDES-2014-7, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Coalition formation; Cooperation; Voting;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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