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Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

  • Asheim, G.B.

This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such refinement is offred through an analysis based on Greenberg's "theory of social situations". A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of colective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 20/1996.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_020
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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  1. Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 20/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bennett, E. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games," Discussion Paper 1990-62, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. repec:dgr:kubcen:199169 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September.
  5. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Extending Renegotiation-Proofness To Infinite Horizon Games," Papers 16-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  6. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  7. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  8. Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401, July.
  9. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 159-73, February.
  10. Bergin, J. & Macleod, B., 1989. "Eficiency And Renegotiation In Repeated Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 121-89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  11. Nalebuff, B. & Shubik, M., 1988. "Revenge And Rational Play," Papers 138, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  12. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  13. Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell., 1990. "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 90-136, University of California at Berkeley.
  14. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August.
  15. Asheim, Geir B, 1988. "Rawlsian Intergenerational Justice as a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a Resource Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 469-83, July.
  16. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
  17. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
  18. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1987. "On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 55-75, October.
  19. Goldman, Steven M, 1980. "Consistent Plans," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 533-37, April.
  20. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Renegotiation-Proofness In Finite And Infinite Stage Games Through The Theory Of Social Situations," Papers 04-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  21. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
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