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Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games

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  • Bennett, E.
  • van Damme, E.E.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Bennett, E. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games," Other publications TiSEM ef13c9a9-3db6-4939-96ef-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ef13c9a9-3db6-4939-96ef-5ed39e336ba5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. van de Klundert, Theo C. M. J. & van Schaik, Anton B. T. M., 1990. "Unemployment persistence and loss of productive capacity: A Keynesian approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 363-380.
    3. van de Klundert, Theo & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1989. "Fiscal Policy and Finite Lives in Interdependent Economies with Real and Nominal Wage Rigidity," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 459-489, July.
    4. Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
    5. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    6. van der Ploeg, F. & Markink, A.J., 1991. "Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events : A computer package," Other publications TiSEM 3acd93c9-b28d-4acb-a750-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Elaine Bennett, 1986. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," UCLA Economics Working Papers 594, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Marini, Giancarlo & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1988. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Optimising Model with Capital Accumulation and Finite Lives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(392), pages 772-786, September.
    9. Elaine Bennett, 1990. "Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 586, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Hoque, Asraul & Magnus, Jan R. & Pesaran, Bahram, 1988. "The exact multi-period mean-square forecast error for the first-order autoregressive model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 327-346, November.
    11. Keuzenkamp, H.A. & van der Ploeg, F., 1990. "Saving, investment, government finance and the current account : The Dutch experience," Other publications TiSEM 088ed37d-ab12-47e2-92ed-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    13. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521267571 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Morton Davis & Michael Maschler, 1965. "The kernel of a cooperative game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 223-259, September.
    15. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December.
    16. van de Klundert, T.C.M.J. & van Schaik, A.B.T.M., 1990. "Unemployment persistence and loss of productive capacity : A Keynesian approach," Other publications TiSEM 186d7b1e-4d04-4728-b807-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
    2. Geir B. Asheim, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 427-443.
    3. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov, 2021. "An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-17, December.
    4. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2023. "An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 88-104.
    5. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta, 2013. "Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 3, pages 51-77, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
    7. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 65-99, June.
    8. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    9. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2012. "A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting," Discussion Papers 2012-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    10. László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Koczy, Laszlo A., 2006. "The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 56-64, December.
    12. Montero, M.P., 2002. "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions : The Case of Apex Games," Other publications TiSEM 7dba0283-bc13-4f2c-8f5e-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
    14. Ma, Chenghu, 2000. "Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 451-482, March.
    15. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," ISER Discussion Paper 1175, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    16. Montero, Maria, 2002. "Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 309-321, November.
    17. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May.
    18. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007. "Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
    19. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo.
    20. Maschler, Michael, 1997. "Elaine Bennett," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 243-248, May.
    21. Johanna Goertz, 2011. "Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 547-563, April.
    22. Tranaes, Torben, 1998. "Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 148-161, January.
    23. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021. "An Experiment on the Nash Program: Comparing two Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-07, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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