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Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach

Author

Listed:
  • László Á. Kóczy

    (Katholieke Unversiteit Leuven)

Abstract

In this paper we define and solve the accession game, a dynamic game containing a union and a set of applicants with a per-member partition function satisfying the conditions of Yi [17] to include negative externalities. The solution gives an equilibrium partition of the players as well as, after Morelli and Penelle [12], the optimal path, a subgame-perfect sequence of partitions, where each player maximises the present value of its payo.s subject to others’ moves. While this game can be applied in general our motivation was to model the ongoing extensions of the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information 0111002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0111002
    Note: Type of Document - AMS-LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 15; figures: none
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bennett, E. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Demand commitment bargaining : The case of apex games," Other publications TiSEM ef13c9a9-3db6-4939-96ef-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Weber, Robert J., 1994. "Games in coalitional form," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 36, pages 1285-1303, Elsevier.
    3. Massimo Morelli & Philippe Penelle, 1997. "Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game," Working Papers 9702, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
    4. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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